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Abstract: Within hunting, wildlife populations are estimated to be too high in many countries which is 
assumed to be due to the market failure, that each hunter harvests too little compared to what the 
regulator wants. This may be due to the existing regulation which, among other things, requires knowledge 
of the individual harvest. However, information about the individual harvest may be costly to obtain. Thus, 
we may have to look for alternatives to the existing system. This paper proposes a population tax/subsidy 
as an alternative which is the difference between the actual and optimal population multiplied by an 
individual, variable tax rate. The variable tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference in 
marginal value of the population between the hunter and the regulator. The paper shows that the 
population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum. Thus, the population tax is a good alternative to the 
existing regulation. 
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1.  Introduction 
In France, as well as in many other European countries, big game (e.g. roe deer, red deer, wild boar) cause 
damage to forests and therefore cause conflicts between hunters and forest owners (Alphandéry and 
Fortier 2007, Poinsot 2008, Rakotoarison et al. 2009). Hunters prefer large populations of game, while 
forest owners  experience economic loss due to damage to forest stands (reduced timber quality or 
replanting costs), or costs of averting measures (e.g. fencing and use of repellents) in areas with large 
populations. Furthermore, the wildlife manager (regulator) has to consider potential positive and negative 
effects of game populations on ecosystem services which are not directly related to hunting values or forest 
production. This may include positive effects of game populations on the recreation value of forest for non-
hunters, as well as negative effects of game populations on biodiversity and sustainable forest 
management. For example, large game populations may impede the natural regeneration of forest stands 
and reduce species diversity due to the selective browsing of tree species. In addition, large big game may 
damage crops on adjacent agricultural land, damage vehicles due to collisions, while large wild boar 
populations impose sanitary risks (Ropars-Collet LeGoffe 2009b). During the past three decades, most big 
game populations have probably increased significantly (Poinsot 2008). In France, from 1985 to 2008, the 
harvest of roe deer increased from 70,000 to 470,000, while the harvest of wild boar increased from 65,000 
to 568,000 (INSEE 2011). This may indicate increasing game populations. Simultaneously, the number of 
hunters who have validated their hunting license in France reduced from 2.0 to 1.3 million in the period 
1982 – 2006 (Bédarida and François 2008). Today, the harvest of game is considered to be too low from the 
point of view of optimal resource exploitation. This is basically due to the presence of externalities, i.e. 
hunters do not bear all the damage costs associated with large game populations (Ropars-Collet and 
LeGoffe 2009a).  
The hunting right belongs to the property owner. However, the département
1 government can decide to 
transfer the hunting right from small properties to an approved municipality hunting association 
(ACCA=l’Association Communales de Chasse Agréée). This is the case in one third of the départements. 
Small properties are defined as properties with an area below a certain threshold (30-60 hectares) which is 
determined by the département government.  In département where the transfer of hunting rights is not 
compulsory for small properties, the creation of an ACCA is optional. The creation of an ACCA requires the 
participation of at least 60 per cent of the hunting right owners in a municipality and that at least 60 per 
                                                            
1 Départements are administrative divisions between regions and municipalities. There are 96 départements in France 




cent of the land is included in the ACCA agreement
2. In municipalities where hunting right owners decide to 
establish an ACCA, a property owner can block hunting on her land based on philosophical reasons. In such 
cases, the property owners are not allowed to hunt on their own land. Out of the 36,571 municipalities in 
metropolitan (i.e. excluding overseas municipalities) France, 10,100 municipalities have an ACCA 
(Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs 2011)   
When the hunting rights are transferred to communal associations, game management decisions are not 
made by the forest owner who bears the costs of large game populations.
3 When the forest owner keeps 
the hunting right, she can balance the cost and benefit from large game populations by hunting herself, or 
by making contracts with hunters. However, as mentioned above, big game populations also impose 
externalities which have public good characteristics (vehicle collisions with big game, and the negative 
impact on species diversity in natural-managed forest). In the current regulation, the forest owner has no 
incentive to internalize these externalities by making contracts with hunters, which implies that the forest 
owner will accept a game population which is higher than the social optimal level.    
With respect to regulation and management of hunting in France, the current legislation, to some degree, 
reflects the situation in the 1960-70s when the number of hunters was increasing and there were concerns 
about a decline in game species populations (Alphandéry and Fortier 2007, LeGoffe and Vollet 2008). 
Hunting plans were introduced by law in 1963 and were implemented in all French regions during the 
1970s. The hunting plans introduced a quota system which restricted the harvest of big game such as stags, 
roe deer, fallow deer, mouflon and chamois. Hunting plans were accompanied by other measures which 
were designed to enhance reproductive conditions for the hunted wildlife (setting aside reserves where 
hunting was not allowed),
4 while rules for compensation for damages caused by game were also 
implemented during the same period (Alphandéry and Fortier 2007,p.45). Since 1970s, the hunting plans 
have been a major element in the French regulation of the hunting of big game (LeGoffe and Vollet 2008, 
p7). Subsequent revisions to the regulations have emphasized that the hunting plan should balance 
interests (agricultural versus forestry) including a specification of the minimum harvest levels (Charlez 
2008).  
If the owner of a hunting right (landowner, contractor, or ACCA) wants to execute this, the hunting right 
owner is required to have a hunting plan for the area. The hunting plan is based on potential information 
about the game population in the area and previous incidences of damages caused by the game. 
                                                            
2 In Moselle and Alsace, hunting is managed by the communes (municipalities). 
3 However, the landowner can also be a member of a communal hunting organization and thereby influence the 
decisions made regarding the management of game. 




Furthermore, the plan is coordinated with a département level hunting plan, in which the minimum and 
maximum harvest for the département is determined for the coming hunting season. The duration of the 
plan is three years for big game. The plan states who is allowed to hunt on the territory specified in the plan 
and the maximum and minimum harvest for each relevant species and may also include restrictions on the 
sex and age of the eligible game. The hunting plan is the basis for an initial allocation of bracelets to 
hunters in the beginning of the hunting season. A bracelet is a strap which has to be attached to the game 
immediately after it has been killed. Transportation of the game without a bracelet is subject to penalty. 
Hunters pay for the bracelets, the sale of which contributes to funding the compensation of landowners 
(forest or agricultural land) who have experienced damage caused by game. This fund is managed by the 
département association of hunters (Fédérations Départementales des Chasseurs). The price of the bracelet 
is set by the département administration within a national upper limit and depends on the damage caused 
by the big game. The individual harvests are directly observable as a bracelet, which is sold by the 
department, is attached to all big game which is killed.  
Farmers are eligible for compensation for wildlife damage to crops, while forest owners are only eligible for 
compensation in certain situations. Forest owners are compensated for damage to forest stands if the 
owner does not have any control over the hunting, e.g. when the hunting rights have been transferred to 
the communal hunting association (Charlez 2008, p.61). Alternatively, forest owners can ask for 
compensation for protection measures. In other situations, in which the forest owner has sold the hunting 
right voluntarily, it is only possible for the hunting right holder to obtain compensation by claiming the civil 
code if  the minimum number of animals killed, stated in the hunting plan, has not been achieved (Charlez 
2008, p.63). Alternatively, the forest owner can, in principle, include compensation measures through the 
hunting lease contract. However, this would only concern the damage imposed on the forest owner and 
not other externalities caused by game populations (e.g. loss of biodiversity). Note also that the 
compensation paid by the hunters through the bracelet system is not an internalization of the damage 
costs. The hunting fee is pooled in a regional fund and therefore the individual hunter does not pay 
significantly less compensation if she harvests more animals thereby reducing the game population locally.   
If the minimum harvest is not achieved in a season, the beneficiaries of the hunting right may have to 
comply with different additional obligations in the following hunting season, e.g. keeping a hunting diary. 
Assessments have shown that, in most departments, the aggregate harvest level is lower than the 
aggregate minimum harvest levels determined by the hunting plans. 
To sum up, the current regulations of big game hunting in France are complex. They involve a tax on the 




compensating land owners, and detailed administrative regulation of the number of animals shot. 
However, the regulation has been unable to ensure an optimal big game population in France (Poinsot 
2008, p41).
  
Therefore, we propose a simplification of the existing system for the regulation of hunting. It is assumed 
that the purpose of the regulation is to achieve economic efficiency
5. Instead of the existing system which is 
based on, among others, hunting plans and monitoring and taxing the harvest of each individual hunter, we 
propose a tax/subsidy on the game population. Thus, the individual harvest is not used as a tax/subsidy 
variable. The individual harvest is measured in the existing system. However, without the bracelet system, 
the individual harvest is unobservable. The starting point for our tax on game population is that measuring 
the individual harvest involves high costs precisely because of the bracelet system. Instead of using the 
individual harvest as a tax variable, we purpose the use of the population size, which should reduce the 
measurement costs. The market failure which we address arises because hunters and regulators value the 
game population differently. For the regulators, a larger game population entails a lower benefit than it 
does for hunters because of, e.g. the damage caused by the browsing of trees. If the population is larger 
than the optimal/target population, a tax is imposed, which is equal to the difference in population 
multiplied by a variable tax rate that varies between hunters. Provided that the population is lower than 
the target population, a subsidy is given which is equal to the difference in populations multiplied by an 
individual, variable subsidy rate. The individual variable tax/subsidy reflects the difference in marginal net 
benefits between regulators and hunters. Such a tax secures a first-best optimum.  
In this paper, we analyze a break-even tax system. Thus we are interested in a tax system where the total 
tax payment is zero. Therefore, we may exclude the simple solution of a subsidy for hunting.  A subsidy for 
hunting does not imply break-even. An alternative to the population tax could be a two-part tariff (see 
Turner, 1996). The starting point for most two-part tariffs (a fixed tax and a subsidy per unit) is that the 
total tax payment is equal to zero. Then we could impose a fixed tax and a subsidy per unit harvest. The 
subsidy could be the difference in net benefits between the regulator and hunter. In order to break even, 
the fixed tax could be the total subsidy shared by the number of hunters. However, such a system does not 
secure a first-best optimum. Some hunters, who have a positive net benefit, are excluded from hunting 
because of the fixed tax. If the fixed tax is larger than the hunter’s net benefit, the hunter will not 
participate even though he has a positive rent. In general, the optimal two-part tariff involves a subsidy that 
is smaller than the difference in rents and a fixed tax that is smaller than the above-mentioned fixed tax. 
                                                            
5 Other objectives than economic efficiency may determine the choice of hunting regulation, e.g. biological objectives 
or equity concerns. For example, the land owners’ right to compensation for damages was originally introduced as a 




Thereby, the welfare gain of correcting differences in rents is balanced against the welfare loss of excluding 
hunters due to the fixed tax. Thus, a two-part tariff only secures a second-best optimum. The advantage of 
our population tax is that a first-best optimum is secured. 
The inspiration for our population tax is taken from the literature on non-point pollution. More specifically, 
we use the ambient tax in Segerson (1988). With non-point pollution, individual pollution cannot be 
observed, but the aggregate pollution for several agents can be measured. In our paper, the exact 
individual harvest is expensive to observe, but the population size can be measured. The translation of the 
non-point pollution mechanism to hunting is important due to the fact that the optimization of hunting 
involves a resource restriction. This is not the case for pollution. 
Within fisheries economics, a number of contributions have attempted to translate a non-point pollution 
mechanism to resource economics (Jensen and Vestergaard 2001, Jensen and Vestergaard 2006, Hansen et 
al 2006, and Jensen and Kronbak 2009). The main problem within fisheries is that the individual harvest is 
unobservable due to illegal landings and discard. However, the population size, and thereby the aggregate 
harvest, is assumed to be measurable. However, one difference arises between hunting and fisheries. 
Within fisheries, the market failure arises due to a restriction that is not incorporated by individual 
fishermen. For hunting, the main market failure is due to a difference in net benefits between the regulator 
and hunters. Second, it is easier to measure stocks for hunting than for fisheries. This makes stock taxes 
easier to apply for hunting. Thus, the translation of a non-point pollution mechanism to hunting is an 
important contribution to the literature. 
Several studies have analyzed the welfare economic optimal management of hunting in the case where 
wild animals are both valuable and a nuisance. Zivin et al. (2000) analyze hunting and trapping regimes in 
the regulation of feral pigs in California and apply a bio-economic model.  A similar approach has been 
applied by Ropars-Collet and Le Goffe (2009a,b) in their analysis of big game in France. Rakotoarison et al. 
(2009) analyze the roe deer population dynamics and damage costs in a simulation model which represents 
a region in the south west of France. Skonhoft (2005) and Skonhoft and Olaussen (2005) have analyzed the 
optimal management of moose in Norway taking into account hunting benefit, as well as browsing damage, 
by applying a spatial model which  explicitly includes migration behavior . However, none of these studies 
explicitly address the implementation of an optimal management regime. Horan and Bulte (2004), Rondeau 
and Bulte (2005), and Bulte and Rondeau (2007) analyze measures of wildlife conservation with the 
presence of hunting in a developing country context, i.e. with imperfect property rights. The measures 
analyzed include trade measures applied by the international community and compensation paid to 




The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the proposed population tax, while the tax is 
discussed in section 3. In section 4, the paper is concluded. 
2. The mechanism 
Within hunting, the individual harvest is currently measured exactly. Each hunter registers the 
harvest and reports it to the regulator. The reported harvest is, then, used as the basis for 
collecting a tax from every hunter. However, this system is expensive. It is costly for the regulator 
to register the exact harvest for each individual hunter and to impose the tax. Therefore, we 
decided to search for an alternative to the current system. The starting point for this alternative is 
that the individual harvest is unobservable. Thus, a moral hazard problem arises and, therefore, 
we use the population size as the tax variable. As mentioned in the introduction, amarket failure 
arises because hunters do not correctly estimate the benefits of the population. We assume that 
the hunters value the benefits of the population more than the regulator. If the regulator’s 
marginal benefit is less than the hunters’ marginal benefit, we have to correct a market failure. We 
suggest a population tax as a mechanism to solve this market failure. Note that in connection with 
the model, we adopt a single-species assumption.  
We consider a model which includes a regulator and hunters. Thus, we analyze a situation in which 
hunting rights have been transferred to an approved municipality hunting association. Therefore, 
we do not need to model the forest owner. However, the analysis can be easily generalized to 
include the forest owner. To see this, assume that the regulator is interested in the greatest 
possible welfare, while the forest owner is interested in obtaining the largest possible profit from 
timber production and the sale of hunting rights to hunters. The regulator could now impose a 
population tax which is equal to the difference between welfare and profit. This would give the 
forest owner the correct incentive and we could model the relation between the forest owner and 
the hunters. However, we study the relation between the regulator and hunter and, thereby, 
assume that the forest owner does not have the property right. The hunter is interested in the 
greatest possible private net benefit. As mentioned above, there is a difference between the net 
benefit of the population for the regulator and the hunter due to, for example, biodiversity and 




necessary. We consider a tax/subsidy solution to correct the market failure problem. The tax 
mechanism for individual i is specified as: 
  () ( * ) ii Tx tx x =−      (1) 
where: 
  x is the  game population size. 
  x* is the target (optimal) game population size set by the regulator. 
  ti is an individual tax/subsidy variable.
6 
  Ti(x) is the total individual tax/subsidy. 
Note that ti can vary between hunters. This can be considered as the most general case. A special 
case is then the situation where ti is constant over a group of hunters. This case is captured by the 
general case where ti varies over individuals. 
The aim in the following analysis is to find the optimal ti that ensures that x = x*. Thus, in 
optimum, the tax is at break-even, i.e. no tax is paid. Therefore, we want to find the ti that means 
that the actual population is equal to the target population. If x < x* (the population is less than 
the optimal population) Ti(x) < 0. Thus, individual hunters receive a subsidy. If the population is 
larger than the optimal population (x > x*), Ti(x) > 0 and a tax is imposed on individual hunters.  






                                                            
6 We use the concept target population because the mechanism also works if x* is set according to biological criteria. 



















At the beginning of a hunting season, the regulator announces the target population (x*) and the 
individual tax/subsidy variable (ti). Then the hunter extracts the resource during the hunting 
season. At the end of the hunting season, the population size is measured and the total 
tax/subsidy (Ti(x)) is calculated and paid. 
The individual hunter maximizes net benefits minus tax costs subject to a steady-state resource 
restriction. We assume Cournot-Nash expectations. Thus, when maximizing (2) subject to (3), 
individual hunters take the harvest of others as given. The objective of a hunter may be written as: 
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where hi is the harvest of an individual hunter and F(x) is the natural growth.  (,) ii B hxis the gross 













∂ . Thus, a larger population 
size implies a larger gross benefit, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, it is assumed that Bi(hi, 0) 
<ci(hI, 0) . With this assumption, we reach an interior solution and extinction is not optimal. 

















∂ , i.e. the hunters receive utility from shooting 
animals and/or selling the harvest. A larger harvest implies a higher gross benefit, but at a 
decreasing rate.   














. Thus a larger 























implies that costs are increasing in hi at an increasing rate and 
decreasing in x at an increasing rate. 
(2) is the same as maximizing the long-run economic yield. Normally, we would maximize the 
present value of current and future net benefits (see, e.g. Zivin et al, 2000, Ropaes-Collet and Le 
Goffe, 2009 a,b). This would imply the incorporation of discounting. However, we exclude 
discounting in order to keep the analysis simple, but it is straightforward to generalize the analysis 
to include discounting.
8 
Note that in (2) hi is the control variable, while x is the state variable. These labels are normally 
used within a dynamic formulation. Thus, within a dynamic formulation, an optimality condition, 
with respect to x, is also included. When moving from a dynamic to a static formulation, as in this 
paper, we therefore also need a first-order condition for x.  However, in the following analysis, we 
substitute x awayand, therefore, only let the maximization in (2) occur with respect to hi. 
However, an alternative formulation would be to maximize with respect to both hi and x in (2). 
















for x > xMSY, 

































. (3) states that the natural growth is equal to the harvest. Thus, we are interested in a 
steady-state equilibrium. Normally, we would have that  the change in population size between 
the time periods to be equal to the natural growth minus the harvest. This is the case when we 
study adjustments towards equilibrium. Note also that the steady-state analysis generalizes to 
studies of adjustments towards equilibrium. 
                                                            
7 See Neher (1990) for a justification of the assumptions behind the derivatives. 












in optimum we may solve the restriction ((3)) to yield: 
  (, ) ii x xh h − =        ( 4 )  




=∑ is the harvest for all agents other than i. From (4), 






as the biological response function. This captures how the harvest affects the 







. Thus, an increased harvest implies a reduction 
in the game population 
Substituting (4) into (2) yields: 
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M a xB h xh h c h xh h T xh h
h
−− − −−
    (5) 
Note that Ti(x(hi, h-i) varies between individuals and that in (5) we maximize with respect to hi. We 
have substituted  x away. The first-order condition with a Cournot-Nash assumption is: 
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     (6) 
The assumptions about the second-order derivatives imply that the second-order condition is 
fulfilled. 

















measures the user cost of the resource population as perceived by the hunter. 
According to (6), the marginal private net benefits are set equal to zero. The marginal private net 
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For the regulator, four types of net benefit occur. First, timber production gives a net benefit. 
Here, a large population of animals implies lower timber production. Second, a game population 
also has recreational value for forest visitors who are not hunters. This recreational value 
increases with the population size. Third, the regulator receives a benefit from the biodiversity in 
the forest. However, biodiversity decreases with a large population size
9. Fourth, the hunter’s net 
benefit (benefits minus the cost of hunting) is also a benefit for the regulator. Now a large 
population implies a higher net benefit. Summing up all the benefits, the regulator has a benefit 
function Di(x, hi), where hi is hunter i´s individual harvest. We assume that there are n hunters. It is 






 while the marginal benefit of population size is positive for small 
x. This reflects that for a large population size, there is a large marginal loss in biodiversity and 
timber production due to increasing population size, while the marginal value of hunting and 
recreation is low. However, for small x, the marginal benefits of hunting and the recreational use 
of forests are high while the marginal loss in biodiversity and timber production is low.  Regulators 
are interested in the greatest possible welfare from biodiversity, timber extraction, recreation and 








, i.e positive marginal benefit of hunting which 

















Thus, Di(hi, x) is increasing in hi at a decreasing rate and decreasing in x at a decreasing rate. We 





∂∂ . Thus, the hunter values population size more than regulator. 
Thus, the population will be too large with unregulated hunting. This is a market failure which the 
population tax in this paper is designed to solve. 
The regulator maximizes: 
  1
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− ∑      (7) 
                                                            
9 Note that big game may also contribute positively to non-hunters’ recreational value of forest and that big game is 













−= ∑       (8) 
where E is an expectation operator which is included because the individual harvest is not exactly 
measured by the regulator under the population tax. Note that the tax revenue is not included in 
















in optimum. Therefore, (8) may be solved to yield: 
  (() ,( ) ) ii x xEh Eh − =       (9)   
Where E(hi) is the expected harvest of hunter i and  () ( ) ij
jì
E hE h −
≠
= ∑ is the expected harvest for all 
agents other than i. 
(9) may be substituted into (7) which gives: 
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The first-order condition may be written as: 
  [ ][ ( )][ ( )] 0
jj ii ii
jì ii i i
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∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∑    (11) 
The assumption about the second-order derivatives implies that the second-order condition is 
fulfilled. Note that (11) entails huge information requirements. The regulator must know the 
benefit and cost functions of all agents and know that all agents maximize net benefits. We discuss 




The shadow price of the resource restriction (user cost) is equal to: 
[ ( )][ ( )]
jj ii
jì ii
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EE
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∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∑  is the 
expected marginal user cost of harvesting one more unit. According to (11), the expected marginal 
social net benefits are set equal to zero. The expected marginal net benefits are equal to the 
















) and the user cost 
of the population of animals.  
When comparing (11) with (6), we see that hunting results in two market failures. First, there is a 
difference in the marginal net benefits of harvesting. Second, there is a stock externality problem 








∂∂ ∂ ∑ that is not included 
in (6). The term captures the fact that each hunter does not take into account the effect 
harvesting has on other hunters due to the change in the population size. 
By setting (6) equal to (11), we reach the following expression for the optimal marginal tax: 
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    (12) 
From (12), we see that the marginal tax consists of two elements. First, the difference in marginal 
expected benefits (excluding the user cost) between the hunter and the regulator is included. This 









 and this term corrects part of the market failure associated 
with hunting. Second, the difference in the expected user cost for the hunter and regulator is 
included (() [ () ] [ ( ) ]
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jì ii i
Dc Bc Dc x xx
EE
x xh x xh x xh ≠
∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
−− − − −




each hunter pays the full marginal damage which is caused by harvesting. Thus, incentives to free-
ride are excluded. The damage may vary between individuals. As mentioned above, a special case 




Some aspects of the proposed incentive scheme need to be discussed further. Hunters will be 
opposed to a tax since part of their net benefit is exhausted. This conclusion applies to the 
mechanism in this paper if the actual population size is above the optimal population size. 
Therefore, it can be argued that population taxes are impossible to implement for hunting. 
However, with our tax, the tax payment is zero because the population is equal to the target 
population, and, therefore, the total tax is zero. In addition, one could propose a combination of 
individual transferable quotas and taxes to secure the fair distribution of the net benefits between 
regulators and hunters if quotas are grandfathered away. Thus, by selecting the share of taxes and 
quotas, we select the share of rent to regulators and hunters. However, introducing individual 
quotas necessitates exact information about individual harvests. Thus, we are back to the 
information requirements of the existing system. Another solution would be to pay back at least a 
part of the collected tax revenue to hunters as a lump-sum transfer if the actual population is 
above the optimal population. Furthermore, it can be argued that the tax arrived at in this paper is 
no different from the present harvest tax. An optimal harvest tax with economic objectives is the 
difference in net benefits, as it is for the tax in this paper. However, with regard to harvest taxes, 
an important difference arises. In this paper, population size and not the harvest, is the tax 
variable. 
A problem is that in practice, most hunting activities harvest multiple species. Thus, the single-
species assumption in this paper makes the population tax of little value. However, the analysis 
generalizes to a multi-species setting. In this case, welfare for owners and rents for hunters are 
defined over several species and multiple restrictions are included. However, the multi-species 
analysis becomes quite complicated because species interaction must be taken into consideration. 




with collusion among hunters. Hunters could collude in order to only pay the population tax once. 
However, compared to fisheries and pollution, it is reasonably easy for forest owners to measure 
the number of participants. If the number of participants is observable, collusion is not possible, 
and thus, the problem of collusion is of minor importance for hunting 
Another criticism of the mechanism proposed here is that it does not secure budget-balance. By 
budget-balance we mean that the welfare gain of moving to the optimal harvest is transferred 
back to the hunters. This criticism is part of the motivation for the work of Xepapadeas (1991) and 
Govinsdasmy et al (1994) on non-point pollution. Xepapadeas (1991) proposes a random penalty 
mechanism to solve non-point pollution problems, while Govinsdasmy et al (1994) suggest an 
environmental ranking tournament. Even though it is relevant to discuss the environmental 
ranking tournament and random penalty mechanism for hunting, a fairly simple solution to the 
budget-balance problem would be to pay back the social benefit from falling in line with the 
optimal harvest to hunters, which would ensure  budget-balance. 
Furthermore, the information requirements for the proposed tax mechanism can be discussed. 
This point is part of the motivation for the work by Hansen (1999) and Hansen (2001). Within 
hunting, economic taxes could be criticized for requiring too much information. For example, the 
mechanism in this paper implies that the individual benefit and cost functions must be known. 
However, this also represents a challenge for the existing regulation, because any attempt to 
regulate in an optimal fashion depends on reliable data regarding costs and benefits. For example, 
when setting an optimal individual quota, regulators also depend on reliable cost and benefit data. 
A question that arises is how reliable cost and benefit data can be collected if hunters know they 
are being used to calculate a population tax. A solution to this problem would be to collect the 
data by participating in randomly selected hunting trips. Another solution would be to collect cost 
and benefit data through revealed or stated preference studies. For example, Ropars-Collet and Le 
Goffe (2009a) estimate hunters’ marginal implicit prices for game hunting in eastern French 
forests using the hedonic pricing method on a sample of hunting lease prices. It is also possible to 
reduce the information requirements by adopting simplifying assumptions. For example, we could 
work with groups of homogenous hunters. Another solution to the information requirement 




We could, then, let hunters select the tax and target population size that they prefer. Thus, 
hunters would self-select into groups just as for a club good. Furthermore, in practice, the 
information demands are no greater than if the ambition is to regulate in an optimal fashion using 
the current tax or mandatory regulations on harvest. Note also that the increased information 
requirements are due to the fact that more realistic assumptions about the information structure 
are allowed. In other words, the paper is conducted within what Russell (1994) calls complex 
regulation. Under complex regulation, more realistic discussions of regulatory regimes are 
permitted by dropping some of the simplifying assumptions which are traditionally used. The price 
of more realistic assumptions is an increase in complexity. The issue of complex regulation arises 
in another way. The regulatory structure proposed here is complex, since it combines the target 
population and taxes. However, it must be noted that the present regulatory structure is at least 
as complex. 
The discussion of information problems is related to the analysis by Cabe and Herriges (1992), who 
mention two points in connection with non-point pollution. First, the tax scheme will only work if 
hunters think that they have a significant influence on the game population size. Thus, hunters 
must react to the population tax by taking their effect on the population into account to some 
degree. If hunters do not react in this way, the tax becomes ineffective. Hunters would interpret it 
as a lump-sum tax, which does not influence marginal incentives to harvest. This is the same as 
saying that the tax works best in small groups. In small groups, hunters believe that they can 
influence the population size. Note also that the tax will work if biological criteria are used to 
determine the target population. All that is required is that the marginal value of the harvest is 
determined. Second, the mechanism requires a reliable population estimate and an estimate of 
the natural growth. Within hunting it has proven difficult to estimate populations. Furthermore, 
game populations and growth information are based on harvest data, and because harvest is 
imprecisely measured, it may be difficult to obtain population and growth estimates. However, the 
mechanism also works if we only have a rough indicator of the population size. In this case, the 
regulator announces a target population size and individual variable tax rate based on expected 
values. Hunters react to this and a second-best optimum is achieved. Note that under the current 
regulation, forest owners and farmers are, under certain conditions, compensated for their private 




damages. This assessment could be considered as an indicator of the size of the game population. 
Note also that the paper does not attempt to solve the problems mentioned by Cabe and Herriges 
(1992). However, it can be argued that these problems are not as significant in hunting as they are 
in fisheries and non-point pollution. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In France, the current regulation of hunting is very complex. It involves a tax on the individual 
hunter’s harvest (payment of bracelets), a levy on hunting licenses, schemes for compensating 
land owners, and detailed administrative regulation of the number of animals harvested. We 
propose a simplification of this regulation. The starting point for the analysis in this paper is that 
the individual harvest is unobservable without the bracelets. Thus, the individual harvest cannot 
be used as a tax/subsidy variable. The market failure that is analyzed in this paper is that hunters 
and regulators value the game population differently. The marginal value of large population sizes 
is greater for hunters than it is for the regulator. We propose making the population the 
tax/subsidy variable. If the actual population is above the optimal population, each hunter pays a 
tax which is equal to the difference in populations multiplied by a tax that varies between 
individual hunters. Provided the actual population is below the optimal population, each hunter 
receives a subsidy which reflects the difference in population multiplied by an individual variable 
subsidy rate. The variable tax/subsidy reflects the difference in the marginal valuation of 
population size between the regulator and the hunter and the differences in user costs of 
populations between the two actors. This tax scheme will secure a first-best optimum. Note also 
that the population tax works if there are problems with measuring the population size. If we can 
fix an expected population size, the mechanism will be able to ensure it. A measure of the 
population could be obtained in the same way as in the existing hunting plans. Here 
recommendations for the minimum and maximum harvest are based on the expected population 
size. However, several problems arise with the tax/subsidy mechanism. These include the lack of a 
budget balance, large information requirements, problems with measuring the population size, 
multi-species hunting and collusion among hunters. Important topics for future research include 




interest to develop a mechanism that secures the budget-balance and raises the minimum 
information requirements. 
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